

**LANDPOWER AND CRISES:
ARMY ROLES AND MISSIONS IN
SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES
DURING THE 1990s**

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| Abstract The author analyzes the role of landpower in the 170 small-scale contingencies conducted during the last decade. He divides such contingencies into engagement, enhanced deterrence, hostility, and stabilization phases, and discusses the military's role in each one. The author points out recurring problems in planning, execution, and force structure for such missions. He concludes that, despite the desires of American leaders to limit the capability mismatch between military and civilian organizations, combined with the requirements of peace operations and the character of American soldiers, such problems are unavoidable. Recommendations include acceptance of some degree of nation-building as the Army's mission and adapting its force structure, training, and planning accordingly. | | |
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FOREWORD

Though the end of the Cold War brought a decrease in the likelihood of global war and significant reductions in U.S. military force levels, demands placed on remaining American military forces increased rather than subsided. Over the past decade, American political leaders have used military forces much more frequently to achieve national policy objectives. Most of the post-Cold War deployments fall under the general heading of smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs), but their cumulative effect has placed considerable burdens on the Army, in particular.

In this study, Dr. Conrad Crane analyzes the role of landpower in the 170 SSCs conducted during the last decade. He disaggregates such contingencies into engagement, enhanced deterrence, hostility, and stabilization phases, and discusses the military's role in each one. Though cruise missiles and aircraft have been the primary policy tool for actual hostilities, the Army has been the predominant service in the other phases, especially for stabilization. He points out that no major foreign policy objectives have been achieved from major theater deployments during the last decade without some form of significant long-term Army involvement in the region after the crisis has been resolved.

Nonetheless, there have been many flaws in the Army's performance during the stabilization phase of these SSCs. Using historical examples and unit after-action reports, Dr. Crane points out recurring problems in planning, execution, and force structure for such missions. He concludes that despite the desires of American leaders to limit the nation-building involvement of the troops they deploy, the capability mismatch between military and civilian organizations, combined with the requirements of peace operations and character of American soldiers, makes such a result unavoidable. He argues that the Army

especially needs to accept some degree of nation-building as its mission, and adapt its force structure, training, and planning accordingly. He also presents some other recommendations to enhance further the Army's ability to meet the full spectrum of future challenges it will face.

There is much in this study to support the current program for Army Transformation, as well as to present a case for a larger active force structure, especially for combat support and combat service support. Dr. Crane's analysis and recommendations also merit examination as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review process. Statistical analysis of the period since America became the world's lone superpower suggests that its armed forces will face an increasing number of SSCs. The services will have to find a way to accomplish these most-likely missions while still retaining full ability to win those major wars that remain the most dangerous threat to national security.

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CONRAD C. CRANE joined the Strategic Studies Institute in September 2000 after 26 years of military service that concluded with 9 years as Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy. He has written or edited books on the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and Korea, and published articles on military issues in such journals as *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, *The Journal of Military History*, *The Historian*, and *Aerospace Historian*, as well as in a number of collections and reference books. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy along with an M.A. and Ph.D. from Stanford University. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.


LANDPOWER AND CRISES: ARMY ROLES AND MISSIONS IN SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES DURING THE 1990s

You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life--but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do it on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.

T.R. Fehrenbach¹

Introduction.

Prior to World War II, the majority of instances where American armed forces were used abroad involved Marine or Navy actions to protect U.S. citizens or promote national interests. The use of American military forces (especially the Army) expanded considerably with the advent of the Cold War and America's ascension to superpower status.² Since the end of the Cold War, there has been another significant increase in the use of military forces (with special emphasis again on the Army) by American political leaders to achieve policy objectives. Except for the major theater war of Operation DESERT STORM, these deployments have fallen under the broad heading of smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs). While this overall increase in theater military operations began in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM, it stabilized at a high level during the first full year of the Clinton administration. Since mid-1993, American military forces have engaged in 170 separate SSCs, ranging from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping, averaging between 20 and 30 a month.³ (See Figure 1.) During this same time frame, the administration implemented a National Security Strategy that involved the military heavily in peacetime engagement



- January 1990 to January 1993 -- increasing number of operations
- January 1993 to October 1993 -- transition period
- October 1993 to October 2000--number of operations fluctuates, but rate of increase stabilizes (slower rate of increase)

Figure 1. SSC Operations – January 1990 to September 2000.

activities to shape the environment to preclude the advent of a crisis that could require even more forces. The purpose of this monograph is to look at the typical roles of Army forces during the life cycle of these SSCs, beginning with normal activities and progressing to the stabilization phase after force deployment and possible hostilities. Its findings support the assertion of the oft-quoted opening passage that the long-term achievement of a nation's security objectives--even for SSCs--depends primarily on the capabilities and sacrifices of its ground forces.

The U.S. Commission on National Security--21st Century has produced a "strategic spectrum" that displays the progress of a crisis that escalates to hostilities. They disaggregate the process into phases that move from Peace to Crisis to Conflict to Post-Conflict and then return to Peace.⁴ This depiction of the life cycle of a crisis can be misleading, however, if it is interpreted to mean that the end state is just a return to the status quo, or that all crises inevitably lead to conflict. A more representative construct for analysis of the missions and capabilities required from contemporary military forces in SSCs is to define the operational phases by the primary functions being performed. During periods of normalcy, the geographic combatant commander, known colloquially as the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), will use his assets to shape his strategic environment primarily through engagement. However, once a crisis begins that threatens to escalate to armed conflict, additional military forces are usually deployed to enhance deterrence through a show of force. (If the crisis is more humanitarian in nature, forces may be built up to facilitate possible response.) Hostilities may or may not occur, but the aftermath of any crisis will normally require significant military involvement to stabilize the situation and maintain policy gains. This last phase can take a very long time, but without it the conditions that led to the crisis in the first place will usually return. Currently CINCs coordinate their peacetime activities with Theater

Engagement Plans, and respond to crises with contingency plans and Crisis Action Planning that lead to the operations plans executed in a conflict. Historically, however, because of an operational focus concerned primarily with the conflict phase of SSCs, American military forces have not done as well with post-hostility planning and execution.

While the Clinton administration showed a preference to rely on cruise missiles and air strikes in the hostility phase of SSCs, the Army was still the predominant service in the engagement, enhanced deterrence, and stabilization phases. The Army's involvement in stabilization phase operations has been particularly demanding and has pushed the service to perform numerous unwanted nation-building tasks. As the demands have grown for ground forces in overlapping post-hostility or post-crisis operations, they have highlighted some shortfalls in Army attitudes, resourcing, and force structure that will require changes if the service is going to be able to meet its considerable similar responsibilities for the future. The key finding of this study for the U.S. Army is that it must be trained and structured to execute some degree of nation-building during the stabilization phase of SSCs. The character and capabilities of its soldiers, combined with persistent security requirements and the inadequacies of civilian organizations, insure that the Army will not be able to avoid such missions in a future that will be filled with contingencies requiring its unique ability to protect an area while restoring it to civilization.

Operational Phases and Service Roles.

Almost all SSCs are joint operations, though some missions are tailored primarily for one component. Maritime operations are carried out mainly by the Navy, and "no fly" zones are enforced by air forces. During the last 7 years, cruise missiles or aircraft alone carried out strike missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Sudan, and Yugoslavia. But the Army had an

important role in the vast majority of the recorded contingencies, especially in peacekeeping or show-of-force missions and cases of domestic support or humanitarian assistance, and usually bore the brunt of major operational requirements.⁵

While the SSCs discussed in this monograph vary greatly in kind and scope, general patterns can be derived for missions, capabilities, and service employment in different phases of the operational life cycle in the theater. Before a crisis occurs, a CINC's military forces will be involved in normal shaping missions. Shaping is accomplished through deterrence and engagement, and the current National Security Strategy places heavy emphasis on the latter.⁶ The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) requires CINCs to develop Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs) to link regional activities with national strategic objectives. Essential mission categories addressed in the TEP include operations, combined exercises, security assistance, combined training and education, military contacts, humanitarian assistance, and monitoring treaty obligations.⁷ A significant shortcoming in the uniformity of the CINCs' abilities to shape their theaters effectively with the TEPs is that they are just individually reviewed rather than integrated or assessed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Priorities among plans are not established and forces are not allocated accordingly, meaning that a CINC's engagement capabilities are largely a function of his forces on hand, not his requirements.⁸ The Army provides over 60 percent of America's forces committed to engagement through its 150,000 forward stationed and deployed forces.⁹ While much of this activity falls into the classification of stability operations or support operations, offensive and defensive capabilities are exercised through operations and exercises that also enhance deterrence.

This warfighting capability becomes even more important once a crisis erupts, providing CINCs with a key ingredient in the flexible deterrent options they develop for their theaters. These usually combine diplomatic, economic, and military elements tailored to

stop or control the escalation of a crisis. They may be as simple as enhancements for existing forces, such as increasing the alert posture or manning levels for units already in place. Sometimes theater assets will have to be augmented with new projected forces.¹⁰

Normally some show of military force is made to intimidate potential aggressors and show U.S. interest and resolve. Effective military deterrence has three requirements: the development of objectives intended to be accomplished or defended by force, the acquisition and deployment of capabilities to back up that intent, and the communication of that intent to a potential threat.¹¹ A primary rationale for maintaining a conventional force capable of fighting two major theater wars (MTW) is to ensure that no matter what other military operation America is involved in, there is still roughly an MTW worth of capability in reserve waiting to deal with a threat that tries to catch the nation off guard. One of the paradoxes of conventional deterrence is that the stronger U.S. military forces are, the less likely we are to have to use them. As force levels and capabilities decrease, risks of a challenge to them increase. Another paradox of deterrence also makes maintaining such strong forces difficult in times of peace or budgetary constraints: while it is easy to tell when deterrence fails, such as with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it is more problematic to prove that it is working.

Army units are the preferred forces to form the core of the joint force required for the type of enhanced conventional deterrence that can compel an aggressor to back down and defuse a crisis. Not only do Army forces possess significant capability, the deployment of heavy units also is the strongest possible signal of American intent. The effort that goes into their movement and relative permanence of their placement shows the maximum national commitment to defend U.S. interests. Lighter Army units also clearly signal

commitment intent and usually serve as the spearhead for American ground involvement in any crisis.

The effectiveness of the Army's deterrent is based on its proven and perceived ability to exercise offensive and defensive operations. In 1988, President Reagan deployed elements of the 7th Infantry and 82d Airborne Divisions to Honduras to counter Nicaraguan incursions. Though labeled a "joint training exercise," the operation featured fully armed troops and the Sandinistas withdrew.¹² They no doubt remembered the performance of similar American forces in Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada. Similarly, the deterrent value of the deployment of elements of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division back to Kuwait in 1994 for Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR was enhanced by Iraqi memories of DESERT STORM, and they quickly withdrew from threatening positions along the Kuwaiti border. Further deployments of ground forces to Kuwait in 1996 and 1998 succeeded in modifying Iraqi behavior again, and have had an obvious dampening effect on overt aggressive behavior over time.¹³ These shows of force had the desired impact. No aggressor since the Vietnam War has risked attacking where deployed American ground forces blocked the way.

The effectiveness of this ground deterrence, plus a predilection to rely on airpower to reduce the risk of friendly casualties, has reduced the role of the Army in combat during the last decade in relation to the other services. However, the Army's Wartime Executive Agency Requirements delineated in Department of Defense (DoD) Directives, CINC operation plans (Oplans), Inter-Service Support Agreements, and Title X, U.S. Code insure that it will remain heavily involved at least in support of any combat operation. Its responsibilities for all services in a theater cover more than 30 different functions including Class I and III support; overland petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) distribution; prisoners of war (POWs) and detainees; civil affairs; graves registration; and nuclear, biological, and chemical

(NBC) protection and decontamination. In addition, Army agencies must provide supply support for United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping forces if they are deployed, as well as all inland logistical support for the Marines.¹⁴

However, the Army makes perhaps its greatest contribution towards accomplishing national policy objectives in the stabilization phase of SSCs after most air and naval forces have gone home. During the Clinton administration, the Army was the primary tool to achieve any lasting impact from major military deployments. The record shows that when ground troops leave, as in Haiti or Somalia, the situation soon reverts to the conditions that sparked the crisis in the first place. Only when they remain behind, as in Bosnia or Kosovo, is any stability or meaningful change possible.

While Army forces help keep the peace through the deterrent effect of their offensive and defensive abilities, the primary roles they perform in this final phase are in support operations and stability operations. And as time goes on, the need for combat capabilities continues to decline, while requirements for rebuilding infrastructure and restoring normal life increase. Generally the Army has planned poorly for the stabilization phase after crisis resolution, and is not properly resourced or structured to handle the growing number of such overlapping commitments accruing to it. This monograph addresses these issues in more detail later. Neither budgets nor forces have been designed to take into account the sober fact that during the last decade any major deployment of military force to resolve a crisis in a theater has ended by creating new long-term force requirements there to keep the situation stabilized and to maintain progress towards American foreign policy goals.

Figures 2, 3, and 4 graphically depict the general course and greatest emphasis in the participation of the various service components in resolving a crisis during the last decade. Figure 2 illustrates the employment of Army forces. They are the most heavily involved of




Figure 2. Pattern for Landpower in SSCs in the 1990s.

any service in engagement activities. As the crisis heats up, they are also the preferred instrument to enhance deterrence, as long as land areas are available for their deployment. Force levels build up in preparation for possible hostilities, and even if not engaged in them the Army has the extensive support responsibilities listed above. Then the service picks up almost all the missions in the final stabilization phase of the SSC, which can take a very long time. The Korean example, where an American division is still in place 50 years after the crisis, might be a portent of things to come in the Balkans. Army peacekeepers have been in Egypt as part of Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai for 18 years, and in Honduras as part of Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo for 16 years. Additionally, the longer that hostilities go on with the destructive power of modern weapons, the more extensive rebuilding and clean-up efforts will be.

Figure 3 generally depicts the mission flow of Navy and Marine forces. They are also heavily engaged in shaping activities, especially for CINCs with wide ocean expanses such as CINCPAC. Naval battle groups are an important instrument for flexible deterrent options such as a show of force or enforcement of a blockade in support of sanctions, and the Marines from an Amphibious Readiness Group may provide important landpower reinforcements to affect a crisis. Sealift gets Army forces to the theater, especially heavy units, though there are limited organic U.S. Navy assets for these missions. Naval aircraft and cruise missiles were primary tools of the Clinton administration for strikes and combat operations, a trend that will probably continue with future administrations intent on minimizing casualties in crisis resolution, especially when public support for the commitment of American military power is weak or fragile. However, most Navy and Marine forces remain distant or leave once the crisis is resolved, unless there are some lingering sanctions to be enforced at sea, or a Marine force is left behind as a precaution.

As for airpower, Eliot Cohen has described it as "an unusually seductive form of




Figure 3. Pattern for Seapower in SSCs in the 1990s

military strength because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer the pleasure of gratification without the burdens of commitment.¹⁵ During the last decade the main role for air forces in conventional SSCs has been for airlift and combat strikes. (See Figure 4.) They are involved only marginally in engagement, and while one may argue that strategic bombers in Kansas add to conventional deterrence because of their range and power, they do not have the ability to send a strong signal of intent until they are actually used. A show of force with airpower almost always involves combat actions that escalate a crisis into a phase of hostilities. While land forces can be deployed for a long-term presence along borders and naval forces off coasts, the utility for air forces in the enhanced deterrence phase of an SSC has been more limited. Flyovers of another nation can be viewed as a violation of sovereignty or act of war, might not be seen, and are ephemeral. The commitment that Cohen mentioned provides the signal for national intent that is such a key ingredient for effective deterrence. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) development of Aerospace Expeditionary Forces might make airpower a better conventional deterrent tool, but that remains to be seen.¹⁶ And when the shooting stops, most air combat forces usually go home. However, airlift requirements, which are also critical to build up Army forces for deterrence and hostilities, as well as to execute most humanitarian relief missions and noncombatant evacuations, remain important in the stabilization phase.

Air combat forces do retain a significant role in the stabilization phase for the enforcement of no-fly zones. These come infrequently and generally do not require a large number of aircraft, but can last for a long time and are expensive. Northern Watch and Southern Watch against Iraq have gone on for more than 9 years, becoming quite a drain on USAF resources and personnel. This kind of stabilization is less entangling for the nation, but also much less effective than using ground forces. Despite retaliatory air attacks that the Iraqis claim have killed or wounded over a thousand people since December 1998, there is




Figure 4. Pattern for Airpower in SSCs in the 1990s


little evidence that American and British air patrols have shielded southern Iraqis from persecution.¹⁷ Their efforts have been more successful in the north, but Kurds living in "a Middle East version of Brigadoon" know that the future remains uncertain.¹⁸ Also, air forces can not rebuild infrastructure or restore law and order as ground forces do. Like naval forces, however, they can be very useful in maintaining sanctions.

The importance of the Army role in recent peace operations can be deduced from an examination of DoD expenditures on such missions. (See Figure 5.) From 1994 to 1998, the Army paid 53 percent of the department's incremental costs for such operations, far more than any other service. Second was the Air Force, averaging about 35 percent.¹⁹

Some Historical Examples.

Recent history provides a number of useful examples to illustrate these trends in the employment of American military forces in SSCs. They also highlight many of the special difficulties that appear in the stabilization phase of such operations.

Panama. Operations in Panama leading to the overthrow of the Noriega regime arguably provide the best warfighting model for the employment of American military forces in a crisis that escalates into a full conflict, at least through the hostility phase.²⁰ The crisis period was exceptionally long, beginning with public revelations about General Manuel Noriega's nefarious activities in June 1987 and culminating with the execution of Operation JUST CAUSE in December 1989. Planning for military intervention began as early as February 1988.²¹ When Noriega annulled the election of May 1989, sent his paramilitary hogs to assault opposition candidates, and increased his harassment of Americans, the United States executed Operation NIMROD DANCER as a show of force primarily with landpower. Army units deployed included a brigade headquarters, a light infantry



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.

battalion, a mechanized infantry battalion, and a battery of field artillery. They were augmented with a company of Marines. The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) used these additional forces to conduct exercises designed to show further American resolve and hopefully to force Noriega to modify his behavior. When this failed to occur, the National Command Authority directed the execution of Operation JUST CAUSE. A textbook example of the quality of the new armed forces and doctrine developed in the United States, it encompassed the simultaneous assault of 27 targets at night. Though all service components participated, the Army furnished 79 percent of the forces.²²

Due to a focus on conducting a decisive operation and not the complete campaign, the aftermath of this SSC did not go as smoothly, however. Planning for the stabilization phase, Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, was far from complete when hostilities began. Missions and responsibilities were vague, and planners failed to adequately appreciate the effects of combat operations and overthrowing the regime.²³ Though guidance from SOUTHCOM on post-hostility missions was clear, tactically oriented planners at the 18th Airborne Corps in charge of JTF South gave it short shrift. For instance, the planners assigned the lone military police (MP) battalion the responsibility for running a detention facility, conducting all convoy security, and providing security of key facilities, as well as for being prepared to restore law and order.²⁴ With the elimination of the Panamanian Defense Force, looting and vandalism spread throughout the country. Chaos reigned as American forces scrambled to restore some semblance of order.²⁵ MPs trained in law and order missions did not perform well in unfamiliar combat operations, and were inadequate in numbers to deal with the problems they faced in the aftermath.²⁶ They also could not handle all the POWs and refugees for which they were now responsible. There were not enough civil affairs personnel or engineers for the rebuilding effort, either, and deficiencies were

exacerbated by slow and disorganized Reserve call-ups relying on volunteers. Political-military interagency cooperation was also poor, as many agencies were excluded from DoD planning and the embassy was severely understaffed.²⁷

Senior commanders admitted afterwards that they had done poorly in planning for the stabilization phase and hoped the Army would remedy that situation in the future.²⁸ The U.S. Military Support Group that had been activated in January 1990 to support the growth of independent Panamanian institutions was finally deactivated exactly 1 year later in a much more stable country, though whether it or Panamanian leaders deserved most credit for progress was unclear to observers.²⁹ American ground forces remained in the country until late 1999, when they were withdrawn in accordance with treaty agreements.

Somalia. This SSC illustrates the importance for peacekeepers also to be capable of warfighting, and that task forces configured primarily for humanitarian missions might not be able simultaneously to conduct effective peace enforcement. The two basic problems involved in relieving the widespread suffering in Somalia were delivering adequate food, water, and medicine throughout that troubled nation while insuring supplies were not stolen by bandits, clans, or warring factions.³⁰ The Army's unique transportation capabilities with trucks and helicopters insure it will always be critical in delivering relief to isolated or undeveloped regions of the world, and its ability to provide ground security for any SSC is the most important ingredient for achieving success.

Operation PROVIDE RELIEF from August to December 1992 consisted primarily of airlifts of supplies, but the deteriorating security situation caused the United Nations to expand its mandate to include restoring order. The nucleus for the JTF in Operation RESTORE HOPE that resulted was a Marine Expeditionary Force, but Army organizations comprised 44 percent of the total force deployed in the theater, including much of the 10th

Mountain Division and many support units. After 5 months the first peacekeeping operation directed by the U.N. under the auspices of Chapter VII of its charter replaced the initial force. While the actual combat power of the new force was reduced, its mission was actually expanded to include disarming Somali clans. Most of the 4,500 Americans serving in the U.N. operation were Army support personnel, but the 10th Mountain Division provided over a thousand combat soldiers for a Quick Reaction Force. This is a case where the Marines also kept a marine expeditionary unit (MEU) offshore. The Army eventually reinforced its contingent with Task Force Ranger as well. There was a poor transition from one force to another, and a lack of appreciation for the increasing security problems and capabilities of the armed threats in the country. One problem with short rotations is the loss of institutional knowledge that results. The failure to properly coordinate humanitarian, military, and diplomatic requirements, and the jumble of nation-building tasks added by the newest U.N. mandate, meant that determinants of mission success were vague at best. Campaign planning is very difficult without a clear end state. There were critical shortfalls in communications units in a complex multinational environment, intelligence personnel and procedures, and liaison between military and civilian agencies.³¹

Resistance to nation-building contributed to "mission creep" as those tasks were forced upon unprepared American units or fell to them by default. Forces were not structured or resourced to accomplish all their required missions, and this culminated in the debacle in Mogadishu in October 1993. President Clinton withdrew all American forces 5 months later, and, without a U.S. ground presence, the relief effort in Somalia foundered. The country reverted into "a madhouse of violence and corruption" with a wretched population. Exhausted by a decade of debilitating strife, only recently have the Somalis responded to fresh initiatives from their neighbor, Djibouti, and begun to reestablish a functioning state.³² From 1992-95 the United States spent more than two billion dollars for

operations in Somalia, and about three-quarters of that was expended through DoD. These costs included considerable logistics support for U.N. forces and the rebuilding of much of the nation's basic infrastructure, missions falling primarily under Army purview.³³

Haiti. Like Panama, this was another SSC in response to a long-festering crisis. It began with the military overthrow of President Jean-Bertrande Aristide by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras in September 1991. The JCS sent the first alert order to CINCUSACOM to begin planning for contingency operations in Haiti on April 1, 1993. Because it was an island nation and the Dominican Republic would not allow American military forces to deploy on its territory, Coast Guard and Navy vessels provided enhanced deterrence by intercepting refugees, enforcing sanctions, and steaming off the shores as shows of force. Tens of thousands of Haitian refugees fleeing their impoverished island taxed humanitarian relief agencies and facilities throughout the Caribbean. Planning for active intervention intensified in October after armed protesters in Port Au Prince turned away a ship loaded with U.N. peacekeepers. During the next year, international pressure on the military leaders of Haiti increased, and was intensified even further by obvious American preparations for an invasion. The decision of the Haitian government in September 1994 to return President Aristide to power was to a large extent because they knew Army helicopters and 10th Mountain Division soldiers aboard the USS *Eisenhower*, along with elements of the 82nd Airborne Division deployed from Fort Bragg, were heading for Haiti.³⁴ In fact, General Cedras did not begin to negotiate seriously with the American diplomatic delegation until he had confirmed that the 82nd Airborne detachment was in the air. The overwhelming force deployed in the initial occupation and that force's professional and disciplined conduct and appearance in continuing operations did much to deter and control the actions of potential troublemakers.³⁵

The long lead-time between the beginning of the crisis and actual military intervention combined with lessons learned from operations like those in Panama and Somalia greatly facilitated planning for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.³⁶ The U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) prepared Oplans for both forced and unopposed entry, while DoD conducted extensive interagency coordination.³⁷ Its Haiti Planning Group, with the assistance of other government agencies, prepared a detailed "Interagency Checklist for Restoration of Essential Services." The lead agency for all major functional areas was the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), with DoD support, mostly from Army units, in reestablishing public administration, conducting elections, restoring information services, assisting the Department of Justice with setting up and training a police force, disaster preparedness and response, running airports, and caring for refugees. Military units did have primary responsibility for security measures such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), protecting foreign residents, and demobilizing paramilitary groups. Again, these were mostly Army functions, and the service provided 96 percent of deployed military forces.³⁸

These plans and their execution were obviously affected by the desire of military leaders to avoid getting involved with "nation-building" missions such as those that had led to so much grief in Somalia. Army lawyers wrestled with interpreting humanitarian requests for reconstruction to classify them as mission related and allowed versus nation-building and prohibited.³⁹ Medical units were told to focus on supporting the JTF and not humanitarian assistance, as they were cautioned not to replace the medical facilities of the host nation.⁴⁰ This stand-off approach had its most regrettable result on September 20, 1994, when American forces stood by and watched Haitian police kill two demonstrators. The next day American officials expanded the rules of engagement to allow more military involvement in restoring and maintaining law and order.⁴¹

Similar expansion of Army roles and missions happened in most other areas of the restoration efforts.⁴² The attorneys eventually rationalized that any action that made Americans look good would lessen security risks, and approved more projects.⁴³ Other governmental agencies were slow to arrive or build up resources, so the military picked up the slack. Generally, the other departments had not done the detailed planning that DoD had, and often wanted more support than DoD expected to provide.⁴⁴ A typical example was when the Ambassador to Haiti asked for military advisers to help new government ministries get established until efforts from USAID and the State Department could be established. The result was a ministerial advisor team from the 358th Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade, "the first large scale implementation of a civil administration effort since World War II."⁴⁵ The scope and pace of CA missions increased so rapidly that they threatened to get out of control, and raised fears that such actions would only heighten Haitian expectations that U.S. forces could fix all the nation's problems, and thus set the people up for great disappointment later.⁴⁶

These expanded missions caused many other problems. Engineer planning, equipment, and personnel were inadequate for their required civil affairs and reconstruction projects. Soldiers had to develop new policies and procedures to help set up internal security forces and expend funds. This often required "working around" Title 10, U.S. Code, restrictions. They assumed expanded roles in maintaining law and order, including manning and operating detention facilities and developing new crowd control techniques. Items like latrines and police uniforms were in short supply. Doctrine and personnel were not available to establish proper liaison with the myriad civilian organizations working in the country. As in previous SSCs, intelligence assets were severely taxed, and the force in Haiti had to rely heavily on theater and national intelligence assets to make up for deficiencies.⁴⁷

However, the military in general, and the Army in particular, has received much praise for its performance in Haiti. Nonetheless, since the last American troops left the island in April 1996, the situation there has deteriorated to conditions approaching those early in the 1990s. Without long-term military involvement, most U.S. policy goals have been frustrated. The civilian agencies that replaced military forces have not had the same resources available, and persistent flaws in the Haitian economy, judicial system, and political leadership have obstructed reform. American officials have decried the results of recent elections, and admitted the failure of their policies. Even the Secretary General of the U.N. has recommended against renewing the current mission there.⁴⁸ Between 1992 and 1995, the United States spent over 1.6 billion dollars for operations in Haiti. Over \$950 million of that was expended through DoD, and mostly for Army operations, to include the administration of large refugee camps.⁴⁹

The Balkans. The combat actions in the Balkans reflect the trend to use aircraft and cruise missiles for hostilities, though the threat of the Croat Army had important influence on the negotiations that led to the Dayton Accords for Bosnia, just as the growing potential for a NATO ground campaign helped resolve the situation in Kosovo. The deployment of a relatively small ground contingent, including 350 American soldiers, in the U.N. Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia had significant impact both for peacekeeping there and as a show of force to deter potentially aggressive neighbors, preventing any "conflict spillover."⁵⁰ The U.S. Army has picked up its usual predominant load of stabilization phase tasks requiring more than 10,000 troops in Bosnia and Kosovo, and seems resigned to a long-term commitment in the region. Rotational schedules have been prepared through 2005, and there are discussions in Washington about establishing a "permanent presence" there.⁵¹

Current American operations in the Balkans reveal how force and mission

requirements change during the stabilization phase. Eighteen months after the signing of the agreement between NATO and the Yugoslav Army over Kosovo, U.S. Army troops there are still engaged in "peacekeeping with an iron fist." They are primarily focused on establishing a safe and secure environment under the rule of law, with patrols backed by armored vehicles and detention centers to control troublemakers. The U.N.-NATO justice system has been heavily criticized, and a Judge Advocate General Legal Assessment Team recently found the U.N. mission in Kosovo so severely short of facilities and personnel to establish the rule of law that it recommended teams of 15 Army Reserve Component (RC) lawyers be rotated through the country to reinforce the U.N. effort.⁵²

Efforts in Bosnia are more advanced, and the environment more secure and peaceful. Deployed Army task forces have become lighter with every rotation, and have moved from immediate security concerns towards enhancing long-term stability. By late 1997 it became apparent to stabilization forces (SFOR) that a large disparity existed between the ability of military forces to achieve their initially assigned tasks of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) and that of their less-capable civilian counterparts to meet their own implementation requirements. SFOR realized it could not disengage with such a large "GFAP Gap" remaining, and expanded its mission to "assist international organizations to set the conditions for civilian implementation of the GFAP in order to transition the area of operations to a stable environment." U.S. military leaders on the scene recognized they were moving into the area of nation-building, but saw no alternative if SFOR was ever going to be able to withdraw or significantly reduce its commitment without risking the peace.⁵³

As the nature of the stability operations and support operations in Bosnia evolved, so did the requirements of the peacekeeping force. It needed fewer combat troops and more engineers, military police, and civil affairs personnel. Intelligence requirements changed and

expanded. After-action reports highlighted many shortfalls in the current force structure and peacekeeping policies, many of them common to previous SSCs. Army lawyers again proved adept at "thinking outside traditional fiscal rules and applications" to support operational requirements.⁵⁴ The roles of military policemen expanded to include performing as maneuver battalion task forces and working with international law enforcement agencies.⁵⁵ Difficulties with tactical MPs trying to perform law and order missions reappeared.⁵⁶

There were problems with shortages and recall procedures for RC engineer, military intelligence, and civil affairs augmentation.⁵⁷ The massive engineering requirements for Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD especially highlighted branch deficiencies with command and control, construction unit allocations, and bridging.⁵⁸ A split-based logistics system trying to meet requirements in the Balkans and back in the Central Region of Europe required considerable augmentation and still strained combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) assets considerably.⁵⁹ Liaison officers were in great demand, not just as Joint Commission Observers with the Entity Armed Forces, but also to coordinate with the myriad non-governmental organizations and other agencies.⁶⁰ There were shortages of linguists throughout the theater, which especially exacerbated problems with intelligence. Military intelligence (MI) doctrine was completely inadequate for supporting peace operations, and understaffed intelligence units had to adapt as best they could for the complex "multi-service, multi-agency, and multi-national" situation further complicated by a host of treaty requirements.⁶¹

A Defense Science Board study concluded that Balkan operations revealed many shortcomings in psychological operations (PSYOPS) as well, especially in planning and resources to support engagement and stabilization phase activities for all the geographic CINCs.⁶² Even with all these problems, Army units in Bosnia have continued to compile a

superlative record of accomplishments. However, the "GFAP Gap" remains, with recurring U.N. problems coordinating and directing civilian agencies while recent elections were dominated by continuing political divisiveness.⁶³

Stabilization Shortfalls.

By the time Germany surrendered in May 1945, Allied planning for the post-conflict phase of operations in that nation had been ongoing for 2 years. All staff sections at SHAEF and Army Group headquarters invested considerable resources in developing what became Operation ECLIPSE. The plan correctly predicted most of the tasks required of the units occupying the defeated country. Within 3 months they had disarmed and demobilized German armed forces, cared for and repatriated four million POWs and refugees, restored basic services to many devastated cities, discovered and quashed a potential revolt, created working local governments, and reestablished police and the courts.⁶⁴ In contrast, Lieutenant General John Yeosock, commander of Third Army in Operation DESERT STORM, could get no useful staff support to assess and plan for post-conflict issues like hospital beds, prisoners, and refugees, complaining later that he was handed a "dripping bag of manure" that no one else wanted to deal with.⁶⁵ Neither the Army nor DoD had an adequate plan for post-war operations to rebuild Kuwait, and civilian agencies were even more unprepared. The situation was only salvaged by the adept improvisations of Army engineers and civil affairs personnel, and the dedicated efforts of Kuwaiti volunteers and the Saudi Arabian government.⁶⁶

Some of the deficiencies in post-war planning for Desert Storm can be attributed to the fact that Third Army was the first American field army in combat since the Korean War. Stabilization phase planning historically has been a function of headquarters at echelons

above corps, and continuing problems with more recent operations are at least partly attributable to the generally small scale of American interventions. It also is a result of the fact that for most of the 20th century, U.S. Army leaders and planners have focused almost exclusively on winning major wars, not keeping the peace. The disappointing experience in Vietnam shaped and reinforced institutional attitudes that nation-building missions are to be avoided, a predilection reinforced by legal constraints. Joint Publication 1-02, the *DOD Dictionary*, does not even mention the term, instead offering this more limited definition of "nation assistance":


Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises, or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code Title X (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations.⁶⁷

Semantics aside, the Army must be better prepared to plan and execute a broad range of stabilization phase tasks for the long term. Other regional actors rarely understand American military reluctance to engage in such missions. Africans viewed the American multi-million dollar effort to aid Rwanda as grudging and token because the commander insisted his mission was going to be limited and short in duration. Though U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) viewed the completed operation as a model of efficiency, Africans were still complaining about unpaid bills a year later, and the experience reinforced their perceptions that America was a fickle and disinterested partner in their region.⁶⁸

Some CINCs have begun placing special emphasis on the development and execution of stabilization phase tasks, though their efforts are still in the early stages. A recent ARCENT exercise aimed to identify the key mission requirements for "post-decisive"

operations in its theater. It determined that Army forces would initially have to stabilize the country with actions like preventing violence, restoring the power system, repairing the transportation infrastructure, and facilitating the ability of local authorities and nongovernment organizations/international organizations (NGOs/IOs) to provide water, food, and medical support. Another important mission will involve the internment and resettlement of enemy POWs and displaced civilians. Information operations will include PSYOPS against remaining hostile elements as well as public information to the civilian populace. Army personnel will take the lead in clearing mines and unexploded ordnance that hinder mission accomplishment, and in securing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) production and delivery sites. While providing security for the region from outside threats, the Army will also have to facilitate the organization of a regime to replace the one it helped destroy. This will necessitate reshaping a new local military force and assisting the new regime to reenter the international arena. Before redeploying along with allied contingents, Army forces will have to help reconstitute them while moving to transfer responsibility for the region back to IOs.⁶⁹

Improving Army performance in the stabilization phase of SSCs will require more than just better planning and education, however. Recent operations have highlighted a number of organizational deficiencies. SSCs strain force structure in a number of special ways. Traditional counts of units deployed in the theater underestimate the total personnel involved in the operation. The number of CS/CSS personnel supporting the mission in Somalia outnumbered soldiers actually serving in the theater by up to four times or more. (See Figure 6.) Cross leveling of personnel to fill units to wartime strength or for unique requirements can have a considerable ripple effect on readiness. The ten companies of MPs that deployed to Somalia required augmentation from 62 different units.⁷⁰ SSCs are particularly hard on certain active duty "high demand/low density" units in the



SOURCE: RAND Arroyo Center

quartermaster and transportation branches, such as general supply companies and water purification units. Somalia required all of the Army's active air movement control teams and three quarters of the active petroleum supply companies.⁷¹ The Army has already acted to increase its supply of active and reserve Civil Affairs personnel to meet shortages revealed by recent deployments, but that strain will not be reduced until FY 2003.⁷² The extension of the Bosnia mission has highlighted additional inadequacies in the total available number of a variety of other CS/CSS units that are distributed between active and reserve components.⁷³

Excessive deployments for SSCs have a negative effect on retention of active soldiers, but are having even more significant impact on Reserve and National Guard units not accustomed to such use. Considerable portions of the Army's CS and CSS are currently in the Reserve Component, including 66 percent of the CS and 72 percent of the CSS in Echelons above Division units that are often so critical for stabilization phase tasks in SSCs.⁷⁴ When General Creighton Abrams moved more of the Army's CS/CSS structure out of the active component, at least partly to ensure the president would not be able to deploy forces to another Vietnam without obtaining Congressional support for mobilization, the Army Chief of Staff did not foresee the future course or tempo of service missions.⁷⁵ In Fiscal Year 1986, Reserve Components contributed 900,000 man-days of service; by Fiscal Year 1999 that figure had skyrocketed to 12.5 million man-days. Increased deployments also require more training time and are causing more problems with concerned employers. Additionally, using reserve forces for peacekeeping missions significantly raises Army costs for personnel, transportation, and training, while heightening awareness of key military occupational specialty (MOS) shortages in some reserve organizations.⁷⁶ This pace of deployments threatens to change the traditional part-time nature of reserve duty. By the time

soldiers from the 49th Division returned from Bosnia, some of them had served more than 380 days of active duty within 2 years. Twenty-six reportedly filed labor complaints before deploying to keep from losing their civilian jobs.⁷⁷ There has been plenty of media coverage about the problems faced by guardsmen and reservists sent overseas on unexpectedly long or repetitive deployments, and the situation is especially acute for those high demand/low density CS/CSS units mentioned above.⁷⁸

SSC requirements also have a major potential impact on the Army's ability to fight two MTWs. The CBO has noted that the Service's rather ad hoc approach to forming task forces for peace operations would significantly detract from its ability to garner enough forces for two MTWs.⁷⁹ USEUCOM has already developed a Balkan Disengagement Plan to redeploy its units to other major contingencies that might arise, but American political leadership might not be willing to risk losing gains in the region that such an abandonment might bring.⁸⁰ Analyses of the Army's ability to conduct two nearly simultaneous MTWs have already revealed many force shortfalls for that particular scenario. The Army National Guard (ARNG) Division Redesign Study recommended the conversion of up to 12 ARNG combat brigades into CS/CSS units to help make up for a shortfall of 124,800 personnel in those specialties identified by Total Army Analysis 2003 in order to carry out the national military strategy. Initial units for conversion have been designated, but the whole process, if carried out to its full course, will not be completed until FY 2009 and does not currently address all the shortcomings that have been mentioned in SSC after-action reports.⁸¹

Possible Solutions for Stabilization Shortfalls.

A number of possible structural solutions are available to the Army to improve its performance in SSCs, especially for the stability operations and support operations required

in the last phase. These range from internal reorganizations to relying more on civilian agencies.

Forming Specialized Peacekeeping Units. Some commentators have recommended that the Army establish constabulary units focused exclusively on peacekeeping duties. While this has certain training and organizational efficiencies, it is a bad idea for a number of reasons. At the beginning of the stabilization phase, strong warfighting skills are essential, and no progress is possible without peace and security. The overall conventional deterrent value of today's relatively small Army will be significantly reduced if some units are perceived as having more limited capability for offensive and defensive operations, unless these constabulary units are an addition to the existing force structure. They will also be of only marginal utility in meeting the requirements of the current national military strategy with acceptable risk. Whether created as new organizations or from modifications of existing ones, these specialized units would probably be inadequate to meet future demands for their skills, anyway, since Center for Army Analysis (CAA) projections based on data from the last decade predict the United States will face 25 to 30 ongoing SSCs every month.⁸² One alternative to deal with this approach would be to structure Reserve and National Guard units to perform stabilization phase functions. After active combat units have had time to provide a secure environment, deployment of such specialized RC/NG forces might be appropriate. Their performance in the Balkans has drawn rave reviews from many civilian administrators who like the different attitudes those units bring to stabilization phase operations. But there would need to be many of these units to prevent excessive deployments, and these same attitudes that please civilian observers will draw the Army even more into nation-building tasks.

Creating More Multi-Purpose Units. This option makes more sense, considering the realities the Army will face. General Eric Shinseki's transformation initiatives are very

relevant for this solution. The new medium brigades will retain some armored punch with more infantry. They will have augmented intelligence capabilities. They will be more mobile and versatile. The Army would need to invest in multi-purpose technologies, such as platforms equally suitable for mounting lethal weaponry for combat or carrying relief supplies for humanitarian missions. Another approach might be to employ combat engineers with armored personnel carriers for peacekeeping, relying on their secondary mission as infantry while retaining their building skills, or to use military policemen equipped with armored security vehicles (ASVs). This solution will require more than just new organizations or technology, however. There will have to be a recognition and acceptance throughout the Army that SSCs are the most likely missions to be performed, and that they require a different mindset and training than fighting a major war. Army schools at all levels will have to prepare soldiers better to meet this challenge, and units will have to adjust METLs accordingly.


Increase Active Component CS/CSS Force Structure. A common theme in mission after-action reports, observations from civilian administrators, and exercise analyses is that the Army has serious shortfalls in providing the required CS/CSS support for the operational stabilization phase. Some of these shortfalls are the result of having theater-level elements in the reserve component that might be a late follow-on in a major war but are needed much more quickly in an SSC. This is the case with some engineer organizations. Some deficiencies are the result of elements that are almost exclusively in the reserves and have just become overextended by the unaccustomed demands of recurring SSCs. In other cases, the force does not exist anywhere, sometimes because of the lack of reliable historical experience or planning data to determine requirements. This is a factor in the shortfalls in military police assets to conduct internment and resettlement functions with POWs and refugees. The

complicated multi-national and multi-agency environment of SSCs has also created a host of new requirements not foreseen by planners used to combat operations.

Some deficiencies can be handled by training and equipping CS/CSS units to be more versatile, but most fixes to this problem are not that easy. To effectively increase its CS/CSS personnel and assets available for SSCs, the Army will have to invest in that force structure, particularly providing more active component assets for theater or echelon above corps tasks. Utilizing scenarios included in the *DoD Fiscal Years 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance*, the Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 determined that the Army needed 230 new CS/CSS units to be able to conduct SSCs for 60 days without RC augmentation.⁸³ The list covers many of the shortages revealed by recent AARs, and would be a good place to start to determine expanded requirements.

Strengthen Civilian Agencies. Though this is not something the Army can do directly, it is often a solution presented by those who believe the service should not be involved in any nation-building, as well as by departmental secretaries and officials advocating the roles of their organizations. In some form this solution needs to be adopted anyway, though there is an obvious threat that reductions might be made accordingly in the DoD budget. Ideally, the course of military involvement in a contingency should go according to Figure 7 that illustrates the handoff to civilian and indigenous agencies, but that process can take a very long time and rarely reduces or eliminates all military requirements. One of the objectives of the recent Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 on "Managing Complex Contingency Operations" is to facilitate this process and "reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned ways,"⁸⁴ but the interagency process still has far to go in order to achieve PDD 56's lofty goals. A distinguished and disparate group of participants at a recent Post Conflict Strategic Requirements Workshop conducted by the Army War College's

Ideal Vision of Stabilization Phase



Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) agreed wholeheartedly on the importance of extended military involvement in the operational stabilization phase. The list of tasks they developed generally agreed with those mentioned above from ARCENT, though the CSL conferees put more emphasis on law and order roles and were less optimistic about any kind of timely military withdrawal.⁸⁵ They emphasized that nothing could be accomplished without establishment of the secure environment on the ground that only the Army could maintain. Recent killings in West Timor of staff members of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees have highlighted the essential role military forces perform in all relief efforts.⁸⁶

Attendees also agreed that the lack of quick response capability of civilian agencies and problems coordinating them would insure that the military would bear the brunt of all essential tasks in rebuilding and reorganizing a failed or war-torn state for a long time. For instance, a representative from the Justice Department specializing in setting up police forces stated that even with proper funding and commitment, it takes at least 9 months to have a viable force, and recent experiences show that to be an optimistic estimate.⁸⁷ The good news from this conclusion for DoD is that there is widespread consensus about its essential role in such operations and its budget is probably secure. However, the implication for the Army is that there is no foreseeable future reduction in the nation-building or nation assistance roles that SSCs demand from it. Some relief from this burden could result from practices that have developed to contract services to companies like Brown and Root, but these activities have recently come under fire from the General Accounting Office (GAO) for their costliness and inefficiency, and suffer from the same limitations as operations by other civilian agencies.⁸⁸

Recommendations and Conclusions.

Primary Recommendation: The Army must be trained and structured to execute some degree of

nation-building during the stabilization phase of SSCs. Recently the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness told a group of defense correspondents that in order to prevent future wars the U.S. military is in the nation-building business to stay, and its leaders need to accept the fact that the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines so engaged believe it is an important mission.⁸⁹ His assertion is supported by anecdotes from the field. For example, soldiers interviewed in Nova Brdo, Kosovo, emphatically expressed their support for nation-building. One of them announced, "With every plate of glass we replace in a window, with every door we install, we're helping these people get back on their feet." He also described the importance of patching a child's broken arm and giving a mother blankets to keep her children warm. He concluded, "With every town that we help, we're helping the nation get stronger."⁹⁰ While military leaders and security advisers for the incoming Bush administration have often expressed resistance to employing the U.S. Army in nation-building, recent history demonstrates it will occur anyway. Being prepared to conduct such operations will avoid a sense of "mission creep" when they inevitably have to be performed.

Dag Hammerskold once said, "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it."⁹¹ The same might be true for nation-building, especially during the earliest stages of the stabilization phase before a safe and secure environment has been established and civilian agencies have been able to build up their resources. Accepting nation-building or increased nation assistance as a mission has major implications for military involvement in SSCs, especially in the engagement and stabilization phases, but it would also bring service attitudes, doctrine, force structure, and training into line with the reality of what is happening in the field. This adjustment also probably will require congressional action to carefully alter legal and fiscal constraints about such military activities. A national strategy relying heavily on engagement will also benefit from better prioritization of those activities between regions,

a process that could be facilitated by a more thorough and definitive TEP review process.

Secondary Recommendations. A future of continuous and cumulative SSCs has significant implications for the Army, and the following recommendations should better prepare it to successfully accomplish its missions:

1. Create truly multi-capable units structured, trained, and committed to both winning MTWs and handling SSCs.
2. Increase the ability of units at all levels to train for, plan, and execute stabilization phase tasks.
3. Increase the Army's overall CS/CSS force structure to fix those recurring shortfalls that appear in executing SSCs.
4. Realign CS/CSS force structure between active and reserve components to better meet the demands of SSCs.
5. Ensure adequate focus is placed on the planning and execution of stabilization phase tasks at the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College.
6. Develop planning metrics for determining stabilization phase requirements for issues like POWs and refugees.

At a recent strategy conference, Admiral (Retired) William Owens remarked that the Army remains "the most relevant service" for today's American security needs.⁹² With some of the adjustments suggested here, it should be able to maintain that relevance and perform its missions even better. Though T.R Fehrenbach's quote that opens this monograph was inspired by the war in Korea 50 years ago, it is also relevant to the peacekeeping role of the Army in Kosovo and Bosnia today. Soldiers are there to protect the inhabitants and facilitate their return to the civilized world. No other American organization can perform both those roles.

ENDNOTES

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2. Richard F. Grimmett, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1999*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 1999.
3. Center for Army Analysis, "Stochastic Analysis of Resources for Deployments and Excursions: A Historical Perspective," December 2000.
4. Dr. Pat Pentland and F.G. Hoffman, U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, "A Forward Looking Examination of U.S. National Security," Mahan Scholars Presentation, October 20, 2000.
5. "Stochastic Analysis," U.S. Army Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, *America's Army . . . into the 21st Century*, Washington, DC: HQDA, 1997, p. 5.
6. See the 1997 National Military Strategy, *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now-A Military Strategy for a New Era*, and the 1999 National Security Strategy, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*.
7. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3113.01A, *Theater Engagement Planning*, May 31, 2000.
8. Thomas M. Jordan, Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young, *"Shaping" the World Through "Engagement": Assessing the Department of Defense's Theater Engagement Planning Process*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2000, pp. 17-27.
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13. W. Eric Herr, *Operation Vigilant Warrior*, School of Advanced Airpower Studies: Maxwell AFB, AL, June 1996; Third Army Pamphlet, "The Role of Coalition Task Force-Kuwait: The U.N.-Iraq Crisis of 1997-1998," furnished to the author by Colonel John Bonin, U.S. Army War College.

14. "Army Wartime Executive Agency Requirements (WEAR)," from CENTCOM Theater Support Command Briefing, September 2000, furnished by Lieutenant Colonel Gregg Gross, CENTCOM J-4, MacDill AFB, FL; "Army Inter-Service Logistics Support Requirements," briefing provided on December 12, 2000, by Mr. David Pearsall, CALIBRE Systems, currently working under contract for HQDA, ODCSOPS. These WEAR can be a heavy drain on Army resources. Total Army Analysis 05 concluded that in a 2 MTW scenario, over 57,000 Army CS/CSS soldiers would be needed to provide logistics support to other services. The bulk of the burden falls on chemical, quartermaster, and transportation units. The full WEAR list includes: Inland Class I Support; Class III Bulk and Package; Operation of Common User Ocean Terminals; Intermodal Container Management; Common User Land Transportation in Theater; Military Customs Inspection Program; Military Troop Construction; Airdrop Equipment and Supplies; Power Generation Equipment and Systems; Land Based Water Resources; Overland POL Support (Distribution); Military Postal Service; DOD Enemy POW and Detainee Program; Military Veterinary Support; Medical Evacuation on the Battlefield; Mortuary Services/Graves Registration; Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition; Chemical Munitions; Chemical Protective Clothing and Equipment; NBC Decontamination, Reconnaissance, and Detection; Disposal of Waste Explosives and Munitions; Medical Treatment for POWs and Civilians; Communications Liaison Teams; Civil Affairs Support; Locomotive and Rail Management; Traffic Regulation on Designated Routes; Contracting Support; Single Item Manager for Class VIII Support; Water Support for POWs, Refugees, and Displaced Persons; Medical Support for Noncombatant Evacuations; Civilian Personnel Program; Optical Fabrication and Repair. Besides the additional responsibilities for U.N. peacekeepers and the Marines mentioned in the text, the Army also handles blood supplies for the Air Force.

15. Quoted by Ernest Blazar, "Inside The Ring," *Washington Times*, December 18, 1998, p. 7.

16. United States General Accounting Office, *Air Force Structure: Air Force Expeditionary Concept Offers Benefits but Effects Should Be Assessed*, GAO/NSIAD-00-201, August 2000. The report criticizes USAF for not having quantifiable goals and systematic data collection and analysis to determine the real effect of the reorganization, and also notes that any major conflict will necessitate crisis action planning to pool assets from all AEFs.

17. "The Zapping of Iraq," *Economist*, August 19-25, 2000; "Iraq: Allied Bombing," *The New York Times*, August 29, 2000.

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19. Congressional Budget Office, *Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations*, December 1999, Chapter II, pp. 1-2. Many of these costs of contingency operations are funded in supplemental appropriations, but "raids" on operating funds are often needed to cover expenses until subsequent funding is provided. This has an adverse impact on operations and maintenance accounts, causing additional service strains.

20. Operations were conducted superbly and quickly in a complex situation with difficult terrain, many civilians, and restrained rules of engagement, that required intricate joint planning and execution.

21. John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 1992, p. 7.

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